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Abstract 
This paper aims to stimulate a systematic discussion about what should be the goals of 
aggregate level population policies in the context of population aging and shrinking in 
some parts of the world and continued rapid growth in others. It starts with a discussion 
of the shortcomings of three currently dominating assumptions: (a) the desirability of 
achieving replacement level fertility, (b) a demographic dividend will translate fertility 
declines into aggregate economic growth, and (c) only addressing the “unmet need” for 
contraception in developing countries will result in significant fertility declines. The 
paper then summarizes new empirical evidence on the interactions between changing 
age and education structures and their impacts on population growth, health, economic 
growth, democracy, and adaptive capacity to environmental change. It suggests that 
strengthening the human resource base for sustainable development should become the 
21st century population policy paradigm. 
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Toward a 21st Century Population Policy Paradigm 
Wolfgang Lutz 
1 Introduction 
While the second half of the 20th century – at least up to 1994 – had a strong and 
pervasive international population policy paradigm that focused on curbing rapid 
population growth in developing countries through family planning, the beginning of 
the new century has seen increasing differentiation, if not confusion, about what should 
be the goal of population policies and what the appropriate instruments for pursuing 
them are. The International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in 
Cairo 1994 has seen a paradigm shift away from demographic targets to a focus on 
individual reproductive and human rights, thus essentially giving up on aggregate 
population level considerations. Today, governments of an increasing number of 
countries, whose low fertility levels and rapidly ageing populations cause serious 
concern, are forcefully returning to aggregate level considerations and search for policy 
interventions that are both effective at the population level and socially acceptable at the 
individual level. Meanwhile, governments of a diminishing number of high fertility 
countries continue to struggle with the consequences of rapid population growth which 
are reflected in high youth unemployment, difficulties in expanding health and 
education services and in some instances environmental degradation. While for this 
second group of countries that is concentrated in Africa and West Asia, conventional 
20th century pre- and post-Cairo population policies with an emphasis on family 
planning programs and reproductive health are still highly relevant, there is significant 
new evidence indicating that such programs can become much more effective when 
reproductive health services and the supply of contraceptives are complemented by a 
strong emphasis on girls’ education. But this new scientific evidence does not yet seem 
to have fully arrived in the population policy community. 
The helplessness of conventional population policy approaches to deal with 21st 
century demographic challenges was bluntly manifest at a recent 20-year review 
conference of ICPD. This conference for the UN Economic Commission for Europe in 
Geneva included 56 Northern countries from Vladivostok westward to Vancouver. All 
these countries are in the process of rapid population ageing, and except for those with 
significant migration gains many face the prospect of population shrinking. Bulgaria, 
for instance, has already shrunk rapidly from around 9 million in 1990 to 7.2 million 
today, heading toward an estimated 6 million by 2030. Japan has also started to shrink 
and faces the prospect of losing 30 percent of its population over the coming decades, 
with the median age of the population increasing from 44 years now to above 55 in 
2050. Efforts to turn around these trends through policies that directly enhance birth 
rates have been largely ineffective and are unlikely to change the big picture in the 
foreseeable future.  
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The governments of an increasing number of these rapidly ageing and partly 
shrinking countries, particularly in Eastern Europe and Eastern Asia turn to the 
international population research community for help and advice. This was very evident 
at the IUSSP International Population Conference in Busan (South Korea) in August 
2013. But the international research community seems to be rather helpless. Except for 
some fairly unsystematic discussions about the desirability or effectiveness of pro-
natalist policies it lacks an explicit and comprehensive discussion about what could and 
should be the overarching goal of 21st century population policies.  
In this paper I will try to prepare the grounds for a systematic discussion about 
what should be the goal of aggregate level population policies and according to what 
criteria this discussion should be conducted. There are two important premises for the 
discussion. The first is that the paper deals with “population” in its genuine meaning, 
i.e. as an aggregation of human beings whose change over time with respect to size and 
composition is being addressed. The study of such aggregate level population issues 
corresponds to the original definition of what constitutes demography and population 
studies (Keyfitz 1982; Preston et al. 2001). It is epistemologically a completely different 
topic from addressing the individual human rights issues related to reproductive rights 
and health, although they are frequently also labeled as “population” topics, mostly by 
advocacy groups. Whether or not any policy that may affect aggregate population trends 
is desirable from the perspective of individual human rights, is indeed a politically 
highly relevant question which can and should be scholarly discussed by the human 
rights research community but it is not a population issue to be studied in demographic 
terms. Before studying any possible population related policy with respect to its human 
rights implications there first needs to be a demographic assessment of what are 
meaningful policies with respect to their aggregate i.e. population level consequences 
for society and the economy. This discussion of possibilities to influence trends at the 
population level is the primary topic of this paper.  
The second premise refers to the substantive focus of this aggregate level 
analysis which addresses the changing composition of the population in addition to total 
population size. In conventional demography, this composition is usually studied with 
respect to the changing distribution of individual members of the population by age and 
sex. But throughout the history of demography, population dynamics in a given territory 
has also occasionally been studied with respect to additional demographic dimensions. 
In a review article in Philosophical Transactions (Lutz & KC 2010) these different 
possible demographic dimensions are systematically discussed with respect to their 
relevance to population dynamics and specific substantive research questions. In 
another review article in Science (Lutz & KC 2011) the authors go one step further and 
establish educational attainment as the single most important source of observable 
population heterogeneity after age and sex. This is based on the assessment of clearly 
specified criteria concerning the effects of heterogeneity on aggregate level population 
dynamics and its substantive relevance for the study of social and economic 
development. Following this logic, in this paper I consider education to be a 
demographic dimension and all discussions of population structure will consistently 
refer to age, sex and highest level of educational attainment. This approach has also 
been interpreted as a way of introducing the “quality dimension” into population 
modeling (Lutz & KC 2011). As will be seen below, this choice has far-reaching 
consequences for what is viewed as the goal of population policies. 
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Put in a nutshell, the main proposition of this paper is that the primary goal of 
21st century population policies is to strengthen the human resource base for national as 
well as global sustainable development. Population policies under this paradigm could 
be viewed as public human resource management – to stress an analogy with the private 
sector. Under this approach no certain population size, specific growth rate, set fertility 
rate, or particular age structure is viewed as a goal in its own right. This approach is 
thus in line with the ICPD decisions that have frequently been praised as doing away 
with demographic targets. Population policies should rather try to efficiently and 
flexibly manage human resources with respect to achieving the highest long-term 
wellbeing of current and future generations while fully respecting all dimensions of 
human rights. The instruments for pursuing such policies cover a broad range from 
family and social security policies to education and health policies to migration and 
labor market policies. A comprehensive view of public human resource management 
can help to integrate these often separate policy sectors.  
This paper will be structured in the following way: First I will discuss the 
shortcomings of three of the dominating assumptions of current population policy 
approaches. These are (a) the assumed desirability of achieving replacement level 
fertility, (b) the assumption that a demographic dividend will translate fertility declines 
into aggregate economic growth, and (c) the assumption that only addressing the 
“unmet need” for contraception in developing countries will result in significant fertility 
declines. I will discuss these three basic assumptions with respect to their empirical 
relevance and their internal consistencies once education is also considered as an 
explicit demographic dimension as suggested above. 
In the second part of the paper I will briefly summarize some recent scientific 
evidence about how the interaction between changing age and education structures 
impact on population health, economic growth, quality of governance and democracy, 
and adaptive capacity to environmental change. Most of this evidence has already been 
published elsewhere and the innovation of this paper is only to bring it together in a way 
that establishes the substantive foundations for the relevance of the newly proposed 
population policy paradigm. 
The paper will conclude with briefly introducing a field of modeling in which 
this new paradigm has already been effectively implemented. The Shared 
Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) are part of a new generation of global climate change 
scenarios in which societies’ mitagative and adaptive capacities are captured through 
human capital as described by the age, sex and education structures of populations. I 
will conclude with more general considerations and suggestions how this new paradigm 
could inspire national and international policy makers. 
2 Shortcomings of Three Key Aspects of the 20th Century Population 
Policy Paradigm 
2.1 Replacement Level Fertility is not a Meaningful Goal to Aim at 
The notion that replacement level fertility would somehow be optimal seems to be 
ubiquitous. When asked about what a desirable fertility level for populations might be, 
most politicians, journalists and even demographers would spontaneously answer that it 
is slightly above two children per woman or often even the precise number of a Total 
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Fertility Rate (TFR) of 2.1. The reasons stated in support of this level of fertility usually 
refer to some vague notions of stabilizing population size, or the dependency ratio, or 
maintaining the size of the labor force. But a closer look at the demographic models that 
underlie this reasoning reveals that this supposedly precise level of 2.1 (actually more 
like 2.06 under low mortality conditions) is only derived from a highly stylized 
theoretical model of stationary population. It has little to do with actually maintaining 
the size of the labor force in contemporary real societies. These have an age structure 
which is often quite irregular and the size of the working age population is influenced 
by migration and mortality changes in addition to fertility. However, even in the 
hypothetical absence of migration and under constant mortality conditions, in countries 
with a high share of young people (positive momentum of population growth) fertility 
should be well below replacement level if the goal is to keep the absolute size of the 
working age population constant. Conversely, in countries with relatively few younger 
people (i.e. that have already entered a phase of negative momentum) fertility should be 
significantly above replacement level if again, the goal is to maintain the working age 
population. Lutz et al. (2003) showed that Europe’s population entered the phase of 
negative momentum around the year 2000. Hence in this context of real European 
populations and their empirically given age structures, a reference to replacement level 
fertility makes little sense in terms of the stated goal of maintaining the labor force in its 
current size. On top of this, all real populations in Europe and elsewhere do experience 
mortality change and migration and hence render the 2.1 goal even less relevant as a 
way to achieve the supposedly desirable stationary demographic situation. 
Recently, there have been two independent strains of research that both come to 
the conclusion that for most countries in the world long term fertility levels somewhat 
below replacement level would be preferable to replacement level fertility for economic 
reasons. One is based on an extension of the National Transfer Accounts (NTA) 
approach which collected empirical data for over 40 countries for age-specific 
consumption and income profiles (Lee & Mason 2011). In a recent study this NTA 
approach is combined with the economic model showing that population decline 
actually increases the capital/output ratio, and hence a moderate shrinking of the 
population leads to higher consumption and also welfare. While from a pure 
fiscal/public finance point of view the model shows that fertility should be significantly 
above replacement, combining this with the goal to maximize consumption yields a 
much lower desirable long term TFR: 1.24 for today’s low income countries, 1.50 for 
the middle income group, and 1.79 for the high income group (Lee & Mason 2012). 
A different line of research focusing on the heterogeneity of the population with 
respect to education and the fact that more educated persons cost more due to education 
investments during the early phases of life but are then more productive later in life 
arrives at very similar conclusions. Striessnig and Lutz (2013) systematically assess this 
issue of “optimal fertility” by first defining and discussing a number of optimality 
criteria and then presenting extensive sets of simulations about the implications of 
alternative long term fertility levels on education-weighted support ratios, which also 
factor in the costs and benefits of education. In a subsequent article (2014), the authors 
go one step further and include further externalities to childbearing such as emissions 
contributing to global climate change. Below some key aspects of this analysis will be 
summarized. 
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In their review of possible arguments in favor of considering two surviving 
children as optimal Lutz and Striessnig (2013) also address the micro-level argument 
that there is a supposedly “natural” desire for a man and a woman to have two children 
together in order to replace themselves, and hence continue living in their children. In 
this context Lutz and Scherbov (2008) had argued that it is worth distinguishing 
between population-level replacement and individual-level replacement, and that at the 
individual level it is sufficient to have one surviving child if the primary goal is to pass 
on your genes and continue to live on in the next generation. In the absence of cloning it 
takes a partner of the opposite sex to produce this one offspring. As such, the child is 
made up of only half each parent’s genes. Yet, having two or three children does not 
make the offspring more similar to you. It would of course spread your genes more 
widely, but this is a very different goal from replacement and if this were the goal then, 
of course, one should have as many children as possible. There would be no reason to 
stop at two. There can be other individual-level reasons for having a second (or further) 
child, such as providing the first child with a sibling. But this is not related to the 
question of replacement, and again, there would be nothing magic about two children.  
With a view to low fertility countries Striessnig and Lutz (2013) discuss 
optimality criteria for the fertility level in terms of the economic and social 
consequences of population ageing and focus on maximizing the projected education-
weighted support ratio which is often seen equivalent to, more generally, maximizing 
the economic wellbeing of the average citizen in the population studied. In a second 
step (Striessnig & Lutz 2014) they complement this focus on age structure by the 
possible impacts of different demographic trajectories on future paths of greenhouse gas 
emissions and hence climate change which is also seen as a relevant factor contributing 
to future societal wellbeing. The authors further discuss a third, quite powerful criterion 
relating to strictly national level considerations of changes in population size as 
compared to that of other nations. Although such considerations of relative national 
strength that is assumed to be related to population size has been a powerful driver of 
fertility related policies – ranging at least from 19th century France to Russia today – the 
authors argue that it cannot be meaningfully operationalized in terms of a globally valid 
criterion because it is based on the very idea that one nation increases more than the 
others, a principle that – if followed by every nation – in the end would lead to ever 
accelerating population growth. One might still be able to define some more reasonable 
criteria in terms of national/ethnic identity, or the survival of certain languages or 
cultures which requires a critical minimum population size, but this is beyond the scope 
of their analysis. 
Figure 1 shows the results of extensive simulations as given by Striessnig and 
Lutz (2014) for the European Union. It shows education-weighted dependency ratios in 
which the working age population in the denominator is weighted by a set of assumed 
education-specific productivity weights, and in the numerator children are weighted by 
education costs and elderly by pension costs. This is done in steps of 0.1 of the TFR (in 
the TFR range 0.1-6.0 for age- and education-specific population scenarios to 2100 
(keeping the 2011 fertility level constant over the entire projection range). As the model 
cannot be described in detail here I will only focus on explaining the pattern appearing 
in Figure 1. The legend in the lower right corner lists selected years for which the 
pattern is shown and the resulting level of fertility that would minimize the education 
weighted dependency ratio (OLF = Optimal Level of Fertility). Not surprisingly, if the 
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time horizon is strictly 2030 (and no future considered beyond that point) the 
dependency ratio would be lowest if there were no births at all because this would lead 
to radically declining youth dependency. Only by the middle of the century the assumed 
constant fertility level will start to significantly affect the working age population and 
then towards the end of the century also the elderly population. By 2100 the age 
structure will have become close to stable and this curve (solid line) of education-
weighted dependency has a minimum at a constant TFR level of 1.78. Thus, under this 
model the long term optimal fertility level (assumed to minimize the dependency 
burden) turns out to be well below replacement level fertility. This is for a population 
assumed to be closed to migration and with life expectancy gradually increasing. If 
migration gains were to be included in the model the optimal fertility level would fall 
even lower below replacement.  
 
Figure 1. Education Weighted Dependency Ratios for Different TFR Levels and Time 
Horizons as Simulated for European Union (with 27 Members as of 2011) (Source: 
Striessnig & Lutz 2014).  
In a second part of their analysis, Striessnig and Lutz (2014) include greenhouse 
gas emissions into their model which changes the results dramatically. Based on the 
PET (Population-Environment-Technology) model by O’Neill et al (2010) they 
translate the population trajectories resulting from the different fertility levels into 
trajectories of carbon emissions. It is important to note that carbon emissions do not 
decline linearly with lower fertility because the PET model also considers the emissions 
to depend on changing household size associated with lower fertility. The results of this 
combined model greatly depend on how much weight is put on the environmental 
burden as compared to the age-dependency burden. If we only cared about minimizing 
carbon emission then the optimal fertility rate would be zero. If zero weight is put on 
carbon emissions then the results are identical to those shown in Figure 1 giving an 
optimal TFR of 1.79 with the time horizon 2100. When a weight of .2 is given to 
minimizing carbon emissions and .8 on minimizing the dependency ratio then a TFR of 
1.51 comes out as optimal for the EU27. The more the weights are changed in favor of 
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reducing emissions the lower the resulting optimal level of fertility. Striessnig and Lutz 
also applied the model to China with rather similar results.  
What do these results imply for the question of whether or not current fertility 
levels in different parts of Europe should be considered as too low? When comparing 
the results of the Striessnig and Lutz simulations to currently reported TFRs in Europe 
we have to consider the fact that for many countries the period TFRs are downward 
distorted by a tempo effect resulting from an ongoing increase in the mean age of 
childbearing. Hence the long term stable TFRs considered in this model should be 
compared to the tempo-adjusted TFRs which according to the European Demographic 
Data Sheet 2012 (VID 2012) is 1.77 for the combined EU27. This happens to be almost 
exactly the optimal TFR level resulting from the above simulations without considering 
carbon emissions. When carbon emissions are also taken into account – even with a 
very low weight – the current average EU fertility level should be considered as being 
too high.  
Viewed together, these calculations suggested that current fertility levels in 
Europe are probably around their optimum provided that the European society continues 
to invest in education and this past trend also results in higher productivity. At the 
country level the calculations lead to politically sensitive conclusions: following this 
rationale the current German fertility level is about right but that of France is too high to 
be optimal. These results are obtained even without considering the impacts of 
immigration and with giving only minimal weight to carbon emissions. If climate 
change is given a higher weight, then most countries of Europe and in particular the 
United States can be viewed as having too high fertility even under optimistic 
assumptions about future transitions to green technologies.  
Whether or not the model assumptions made by Striessnig and Lutz are being 
accepted this analysis together with the above mentioned studies by Lee and Mason 
(2012) and Bongaarts and Sobotka (2012), who showed that in Europe migration gains 
compensate in part for the age structural effects of low fertility, make it clear that the 
ubiquitous view that replacement level fertility should be considered as ideal is far from 
self-evident and needs to be reconsidered. Furthermore, explicitly factoring in education 
makes a significant difference in the assessing of this issue. 
2.2 The Demographic Dividend is Actually an Education-triggered Dividend 
The effect of changes in age structure on economic growth has been widely studied in 
the demography and population economics literature. The beneficial effect of changes in 
age structure after a decrease in fertility has become known as the “Demographic 
Dividend”. The major innovation of this concept was a systematic consideration of age 
structure and the associated dependency ratios in addition to just focusing at growth 
rates in total population. A recent paper in Demography by Crespo Cuaresma et al. 
(2013) goes another step forward by systematically considering the changing education 
structure in addition to the age structure. The paper assesses the empirical evidence with 
respect to the relative effects of changes in age-structure as compared to those in 
education structure. The findings shed new light on our understanding of the effects of 
population change on economic growth by showing that improvements in education 
rather than fertility decline are the main driver of subsequent economic growth.  
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It is worth noting that education and the demographic dividend were linked from 
the beginning of the studies made in this field. Bloom and Williamson (1998) studied 
the rate of real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth in 78 countries between 
1965 and 1990. One of their independent variables was the level of human capital in 
1965, measured as the log of the average years of post-primary schooling of the 
population 25+ years old, based on data in Barro and Lee (1993). The results for the 
education variable were reported only for their ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions 
and not the instrumental variable ones. In all those regressions, the education variable 
always had a positive and statistically significant coefficient. Bloom and Williamson 
(1998), however, did not discuss in depth the importance of education changes to the 
East Asian economic miracle. Kelley and Schmidt (2005) further developed the 
demographic dividend model by making a distinction between the demographic 
determinants of the growth of output per person of working age (the “productivity 
effect”) and the growth of output per capita resulting from changes in the share of the 
working-age population in the total population (the “translations effect” or “accounting 
effect”). The productivity effect has been studied in detail in more recent contributions. 
Bloom et al. (2009) show in a panel of countries, that a reduction in fertility increases 
female labor force participation and thus increases the proportion of the working age 
population who are in the labor force. While many of the key papers on this issue did 
include education in their specifications – typically by treating it as an enabling factor 
rather than a trigger – the now widely used and popularized concept of the demographic 
dividend only refers to changes in age-dependency ratios, whose evolution over the 
course of demographic transition presumably results in a demographic window that first 
opens and then closes in a predictable way as the old-age dependency ratio starts to 
increase (UNFPA 2011). Similarly, recent estimates of the effects of meeting the 
“unmet need” for modern contraception in Africa on economic growth directly translate 
assumed lower fertility rates in to higher economic growth rates without accounting for 
education (Bloom et al. 2013). 
Improving educational attainment of the adult population can impact economic 
growth through various channels. Higher skill levels of the labor force can directly 
translate into higher productivity and into better and faster take up of new technologies. 
The direct effects of educational attainment on labor productivity constitute the 
centerpiece of the model developed by Mankiw et al. (1992), which generalizes the 
Solow model of economic growth by human capital as an extra production factor. 
Mankiw et al. (1992) show that this human capital-augmented specification can explain 
income differences across countries better than the standard Solow model. Benhabib 
and Spiegel (2005; 1994), on the other hand, emphasize the role played by education as 
a catalyst of innovation and technology adoption to model the effects of education on 
income growth. Based on the insights provided by Nelson and Phelps (1966), such a 
theoretical framework implies that economic growth is not only affected by the 
accumulation of human capital, but also by its stock. The empirical results provided by 
Benhabib and Spiegel (2005; 1994) indicate that this technology adoption channel 
appears extremely important to explain income growth experiences across countries. 
Following this logic Lutz et al. (2008) extend the demographic dividend model 
in two ways. First, they distinguish two mechanisms for human capital to influence 
economic growth through the direct effect of the productivity of workers and indirectly 
through its effect on the rate of total factor productivity growth. Second, they use the 
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new IIASA-VID education database (Lutz et al. 2007) to disaggregate education effects 
by both age and level of educational attainment. These data are more consistent and 
more detailed than previously existing data sources. Educational attainment 
distributions for four educational categories have been reconstructed by 5-year age 
groups and sex using methods of multi-dimensional population dynamics which also 
incorporate educational mortality differentials. Using data for 101 countries over six 
five-year time periods from 1970-2000, they find that the direct productivity effect is 
particularly strong for older workers with secondary education while younger workers 
with tertiary education have the greatest effect on the speed of total factor productivity 
growth. For poor countries they also show that it is broad based junior secondary 
education that results in higher growth than high education of a small elite combined 
with broad segments remaining uneducated.  
The new paper by Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2013) systematically reassess the 
empirical evidence on the associations among economic growth, changes in age 
structure, labor force participation and educational attainment. Using a global panel of 
105 countries for the period 1980-2005 and several alternative model specifications 
with Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) methods to overcome the endogeneity 
problem in state of the art conditional convergence growth equations, it finds that once 
the effect of human capital dynamics is controlled for there is no evidence that changes 
in age structure affect labor productivity. In other words, this paper shows that 
educational attainment expansions are able to account for the sizable “productivity 
effects” which past authors had claimed to be caused by age structure changes. The pure 
demographic dividend found in the new analysis is therefore reduced to a modest 
“accounting effect”, whose size is significantly smaller than that of the productivity 
changes which are caused by the investment in education. If instead of GDP per capita 
economic growth is measured in terms of total GDP, as is often done in international 
comparisons, then even the accounting effect disappears. 
Since in the context of this paper it would be inappropriate to reprint all the 
formal and numerical details of the Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2013) analysis, I will 
instead highlight the differences between the earlier studies on the demographic 
dividend and our new findings in a schematic form (see Figure 2 below). In this 
schematization the conventional demographic dividend model views fertility decline as 
an exogenous trigger of a declining youth dependency ratio which under certain 
conditions (good governance, investments in education, etc.) leads to higher 
productivity and thus economic growth (Model A). In contrast, the education-triggered 
dividend model views the same empirically observed correlation between lower youth 
dependency and higher productivity as a result of the joint effect of higher educational 
attainment on fertility decline (which in turn results in lower youth dependency) and 
independently on higher productivity (Model B). Which of the two alternative models 
offers the better explanation is a matter of empirical testing, here it clearly came out in 
favor of Model B. 
 10 
 
Figure 2. The Conventional and the Education-Triggered Models of the Demographic 
Dividend 
Yet in other words, there is no doubt (and no difference between the two models 
in this respect) that a decrease in fertility as part of the demographic transition brings 
about changes in the age structure of populations, which in the short term leads to a 
lower youth dependency ratio. The conventional demographic dividend model assumes 
that the falling proportions of children in the total population that is triggered by an 
exogenous fertility decline (often assumed to be a consequence of family planning 
programs) and the associated increasing proportions of the population in working ages 
creates a window of opportunity during which there can be higher growth rates of 
income per capita. This effect is not seen as automatic, however, but depends on several 
enabling factors that also include investments in education. The very notion of a 
“window” also implies that after some time this favorability disappears when as a 
longer-term consequence of low fertility the old-age dependency ratio starts to increase.  
In contrast, the new Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2013) study also demonstrates the 
empirical validity of the alternative Model B which assigns to education the dual role of 
helping to bring down fertility and enhancing productivity. Hence, in periods of 
expanding educational attainment, improvements in education of women of 
childbearing age contribute to declining birth rates, while at the same time a more 
productive workforce (due to the increases in human capital) populates the labor 
market. This Model B also provides a more optimistic outlook for the future because the 
strong productivity enhancing effect of human capital does not assume the closing of a 
“window” and even ageing populations can see continued productivity growth as a 
function of further improving human capital. 
The results of the new study summarized above have important implications for 
setting 21st century international development policy priorities. While not questioning 
the positive effects of family planning services on health and well-being and their 
independent importance under a human rights perspective, the results described here 
imply that focusing primarily on fertility reduction to reap the returns of the 
demographic dividend is erroneous. The change in age structure on its own is not the 
driving force of economic growth during the demographic transition. Instead, a labor 
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force that has the required skills that enable productivity improvements appears as the 
key factor to ensure higher growth rates of income. Under the model supported by the 
analysis performed in the study, it is education which appears at the root of the 
beneficial effects of the demographic dividend, affecting the change in age structure and 
the growth rate of income simultaneously (Model B in Figure 2). In the light of the new 
analysis, the double dividend of education expansions, by simultaneously reducing 
fertility and increasing productivity, can create a virtuous circle of economic growth and 
should put human capital investment in the center of global development strategies 
aimed at poverty reduction. 
2.3 Responding to the “Unmet Need” with Supply of Contraceptives May Have 
Little Effect on Fertility 
The concept of “meeting the unmet need” for reproductive health and family planning 
has over the past 20 years become one of the most prominent goals of the international 
“population community”. It seemed to be the magic bullet that helped to consolidate the 
ICPD concern of individual rights and thus respecting individually desired family size 
with the still tacitly underlying pre-Cairo aggregate level goal of bringing down fertility 
levels in high fertility countries. This concept has even risen to the highest level of 
international development policy prominence by being included as one of the six 
indicators used for Goal 5 (maternal and reproductive health) of the Millennium 
Development Goals. Today it is widely considered a valuable concept which is 
frequently used for advocacy of reproductive health and family planning programs. 
Sometimes quantitative information on the prevalence of unmet need in developing 
countries is presented together with some hypothetical calculations showing how much 
lower fertility levels in those countries would be in case the unmet need were met 
(Bradley et al. 2012). This is based on the strong assumption that somehow programs 
that improve the supply of contraceptives and lower their cost would lead to a near 
elimination of unmet need. In the following I will present empirical evidence that casts 
strong doubts on this assumption, and show that investments in girls’ education is likely 
to be a much more efficient strategy towards lower fertility because it also decreases 
desired family size and can better help to remove some key obstacles to meeting the 
unmet need than a focus on the provision of supply of contraceptives. 
While the official WHO definition of unmet need restricts it to women who are 
sexually active the frequently used empirical estimates on the basis of DHS and other 
survey data define it as the proportion of married women who are not currently using 
contraception and want to stop or delay childbearing. Furthermore, most scientific 
studies of unmet need clearly distinguish between unmet need for spacing and unmet 
need for limiting. Only the latter could meaningfully be related to estimates of how 
many births could be avoided in the case that the unmet need could be fulfilled. The 
definition of unmet need on the basis of Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) has 
recently been modified slightly and re-estimated for all surveys since 1990 (Bradley et 
al. 2012). These modifications essentially simplified the classification of unmet need for 
spacing and limiting by removing calendar data from the calculation and standardizing 
the calculation of infecundity, but they did not address what – in my view – is one of the 
most serious shortcomings of the concept, namely, the assumption that every married 
woman is constantly exposed to the risk of pregnancy no matter whether her husband is 
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around or working far away for extended periods. Strangely enough, this redefinition 
has not addressed the issue that marital status can be a bad proxy for sexual activity. 
Let me illustrate this issue with the example of Nepal. According to the new 
DHS definitions Nepal had an unmet need of 32.4 percent in 1996 which was one of the 
highest among all Asian DHS countries. By 2006 this figure had declined to 24.7 
percent but this decline seems to have stalled and the most recent 2011 DHS report 
show a slight increase to 27 percent (DHS Nepal 2012). This is all the more surprising 
since other indicators of modernization have been improving and the TFR has declined 
from 4.1 in 2001 to 3.1 in 2006 and 2.6 in 2011. Large numbers of Nepali men are 
working abroad, mostly in the Golf states. A majority of them are married men, leaving 
their wives and young children behind and supporting their life with remittances. 
Khanal et al. (2013) estimate that nearly one-third of women of reproductive age is 
separated from their husbands. For these married women whose husbands are away for 
extended periods (up to several years without a visit) it would indeed be very strange 
and socially inacceptable to use contraception – yet according to the DHS criteria they 
are clearly classified of having an “unmet need” if they state in the survey that they do 
not want to have further children. Hence, this definition significantly inflates the 
estimated unmet need figure. While Nepal may be an extreme case in terms of husbands 
being abroad, similar patterns of internal labor migration for working in the mines or in 
cities for extended periods can also be found in many other higher fertility countries. As 
the following analysis of the reasons for not using contraception will show “lack of 
exposure” is stated by almost a quarter of African women which makes it the second 
most important reason after fear of negative health effects. 
A large number of recent DHS surveys included a specific set of questions 
asking women who had been classified as having an unmet need what were the 
obstacles or reasons for not using contraception. In the following empirical analysis this 
information has been tabulated by level of educational attainment of the female 
respondents. There were different predefined reasons that women could state and Table 
1 shows the results for Africa and four sub-regions of Africa. As stated above, the two 
dominating reasons were fear of negative health effects and lack of exposure. For 
uneducated women opposition to family planning (mostly by the partner or extended 
family) was an even more frequently cited reason than lack of exposure.  
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Table 1. Cited Obstacles to Using Contraception for Women Classified to Have an 
Unmet Need for Limiting by Level of Education (Recent DHS Surveys in Africa) 
 
 
With respect to the prominence of health concerns about the possible negative 
effects or side effects of using contraception it is unclear to what degree these answers 
reflect simply a lack of information and are based on unfounded rumors. The fact that 
the percentage citing health reasons as an obstacle tends to be higher for the better 
educated women may also point to this answer possibly being a rationalization because 
it may sound more like an acceptable reason than other reasons in the list provided. But 
on the other hand it may indeed reflect real health concerns as a consequence of poor 
reproductive health service delivery conditions that may result in negative and 
unpleasant health consequences. The second most frequently cited reason is lack of 
exposure and seems to be a direct consequence of DHS using marital status as the only 
indicator of exposure. It is also interesting to see that this reason is more important for 
the better educated women, which probably reflects a higher education of the husbands 
and a higher probability of them being away for paid work. Next in line of the obstacles 
to contraceptive use comes cited opposition to family planning. This includes both the 
opposition of the woman herself as well as opposition by her husband and extended 
family. 
The most surprising and politically relevant aspect of this analysis is the fact that 
the obstacles that are most directly addressed by family planning services such as access 
to contraception and cost of contraception seem to be of only minor importance. This 
has also been shown by other studies of the data on obstacles to contraception (Bradley 
et al. 2012). The DHS data show that of all African women who are classified as having 
an unmet need for contraception only less than 3 percent cite lack of access as an 
important reason for not using contraception. Among more educated women this 
percentage even lies below 1 percent. Cost of contraception is cited by between 5 and 6 
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percent of less educated women and 2.5 percent of more educated women. In other 
words, for uneducated African women who are classified as having an unmet need for 
contraception only 8.5 percent say that either lack of access or high costs are an 
important reason. For women with secondary education only 3.3 percent mention these 
supply reasons which in the international political and advocacy discussion are often 
conveyed as representing 100 percent of the reasons for the unmet need. 
While the analysis presented above casts serious doubts on the possible direct 
effects on lowering fertility of programs that primarily aim at improving access to 
contraception and reducing the cost in the African context there is no doubt that 
improving the education of girls will directly translate into lower fertility through a 
combination of lower desired family size, better empowerment of women to pursue 
their own plans and better ways of finding access to effective contraception. There is 
massive empirical evidence supporting this view which has been reviewed in Lutz and 
KC (2011) and Lutz et al. (2014). This evidence is also succinctly summarized in a 
paper by Bongaarts (2010) entitled “The causes of educational differences in fertility in 
Sub-Saharan Africa” in which he shows for 30 countries using DHS data that not only is 
desired family size significantly lower for more educated women but also that “as 
education rises, fertility is lower at a given level of contraceptive use, contraceptive use 
is higher at a given level of demand, and demand is higher at a given level of desired 
family size” (p. 31). To illustrate this pervasive relationship between female education 
and contraceptive use Figure 3 shows the pattern for DHS countries in West Africa.  
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Figure 3. Ever-use of Contraception by Educational Attainment of Women (DHS Data 
for 9 Countries in West Africa) 
For the above described reasons investments in the rapid expansion of female 
education in the poorest countries can be a very effective policy priority in bringing 
down overall fertility and hence total population growth. The magnitude of the effects 
of alternative education scenarios on future population growth will be illustrated in the 
following sections. When these very strong expected impacts of female education are 
quantitatively compared to the possible impacts of focusing on the obstacles to meeting 
the unmet need the effects differ by an order of magnitude. For the above described case 
of West Africa Bradly et al (2012) calculate that under the very strong assumption that 
programs can eliminate the entire unmet need, the TFR would be 4.9 instead of 5.4, i.e. 
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on average 0.5 children lower. But Table 1 above indicates that in West Africa only 6 
percent of the women classified as having an unmet need actually cite lack of access as 
the relevant obstacles and only 2 percent cite cost. From this indication, one can infer 
that even radically improving on cost and supply without addressing the other obstacles 
would only bring down the TFR by around 0.04 children (0.5 times 0.08). This 
compares to a decline in TFR of between 2 and 4 children on average in the case of 
educating all girls to junior or senior secondary level respectively. Hence the effects of 
these two alternative strategies on the fertility level differ according to these 
calculations by a factor of between 50 and 100. To the extent that family planning 
programs also include counseling and education elements – as many of the programs on 
the ground do – they are likely to also address some of the other obstacles mentioned. 
But even if programs are successful in reducing these other obstacles the net effect of 
fertility would still be an order of magnitude smaller than the likely education effects 
that also address desired family size. 
This is by no means to say that investments in female education should be 
played against investments in reproductive health services. In fact, there are good 
reasons to assume that both are strongly synergistic and strong female education 
programs combined with high quality reproductive health programs are the best way to 
go. But the analysis described here does imply that the often exclusive focus on 
reproductive health without even mentioning of female education – as one tends to find 
it in the discussion of unmet need in the advocacy literature – is misleading and should 
not be part of a reasonable science based 21st population policy paradigm. 
3 Reasons for Including Education in 21st Century Population Policies 
The ultimate goal of any population policy in both high and low fertility settings must 
be the enhancement of long term human wellbeing, including health, wealth and 
resiliency to unavoidable environmental change. Hence, the question of how certain 
changes in population size and structure impact on human wellbeing must lie at the 
heart of any such policy. This is primarily a scientific question. Only once research has 
assessed with reasonable confidence the likely consequences of specific kinds of 
population changes on selected outcome variables that can be taken as indicators or 
determinants of human wellbeing, the question about the desirability of certain policy 
interventions can be posed.  
In this second part of the paper I will focus on summarizing new scientific 
evidence that suggests that indeed education deserves to be given central attention in 
any 21st century population policy paradigm. This review of recent analysis on the 
returns to investments in education based on an integration of population and education 
will provide little new empirical analysis but rather bring together the essential findings 
and policy implications for seven selected areas in which explicit attention to education 
can have significant consequences for future human wellbeing. I will highlight studies 
on the effect of female education on the future trajectory of world population growth, on 
the number of avoidable child deaths as well as on the reduction of adult mortality and 
disability. I will also demonstrate how education can help to reduce unemployment, 
enhance democracy and stimulate productivity and economic growth. Finally, I will 
summarize a recent body of research that shows how education can help to reduce 
disaster vulnerability and hence should be seen as a prime candidate for enhancing the 
adaptive capacity to already unavoidable climate change. 
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Before illustrating how the future looks different when education is explicitly 
factored into population dynamics and summarizing the scientific evidence on the 
various specific beneficial effects of education, I will directly address the frequently 
raised skepticism about the causal nature of these effects. While there is massive 
empirical evidence from all parts of the world and different points in time on strong 
associations between more and better education on the one hand and lower mortality, 
better health, lower fertility, lower unemployment, higher productivity and lower 
vulnerability on the other hand it could of course be the case that some of these 
associations are due to selectivity or reverse causality. If there were indeed good reasons 
to assume that the observed associations are spurious then the case for population 
policies focusing on education would clearly be weaker. This is why the causality issue 
needs to be addressed head-on.  
3.1 On the Causality of Education Effects 
In a “Demographic Debate” contribution entitled “Education will be at the heart of 21st 
century demography”, Lutz (2010) expands on the arguments of an earlier Population 
and Development Review paper on “Adding education to age and sex“ (Lutz et al. 1998) 
stating that educational attainment should be explicitly and routinely included in 
demographic analysis in addition to age and sex if three criteria were met: (1) “To the 
users the dimension is interesting in its own right and therefore desirable as an explicit 
output parameter”; (2) “The dimension is a relevant source of demographic 
heterogeneity with an impact on the dynamics of the whole system and therefore on the 
resulting population size”; and (3) “It is feasible (in terms of data and methodology) to 
consider the dimensions explicitly” (Lutz et al. 1998, p.42). In their analysis the authors 
discuss each of the criteria in-depth and come to the conclusion that they are indeed 
met. Lutz (2010) updates the argument in light of more recent discussions about 
elements of social construction with respect to the presumably “biological ” 
demographic dimensions age and sex. Under the heading “Age is not what it used to be, 
nor is sex” he discusses recent work on redefining age and aging through indicators 
other than chronological age which consider increasing life expectancy and better health 
status at a given age (see Lutz, Sanderson, et al. 2008; Sanderson & Scherbov 2010) as 
well as recent changes in legislation in some countries that allow people to state their 
sex as “indeterminate” in departing from the strict male/female dichotomy. He also 
points at the physiological nature of the new synapses that are built in our brains as a 
consequence of every repeated learning experience and in particular through acquiring 
literacy and other skills through formal education. He concludes that “…we no longer 
face a situation in which there are presumably natural factors (age and sex) on an 
ontologically different level from other factors that are assumed to be merely social 
construction (such as educational attainment). We now understand that all three factors 
have elements of social construction as well as elements of underlying determinism.” 
(Lutz 2010, p.12).  
Social scientists typically express less doubts about the causal nature of age and 
sex effects in their models because they presumably take them for granted. But they 
repeatedly express doubts about assumed education effects, presumably because 
education is mostly viewed as just a specific aspect of Socio-economic Status (SES) or 
some elusive social construction. For this reason Lutz and Skirbekk (2014) dedicated a 
full chapter at the beginning of a major new volume on “World Population and Human 
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Capital in the 21st Century” (Lutz et al. 2014) to a broad based review of the scientific 
evidence with respect to the causal nature of the effects of education on better health 
and survival and other demographic outcomes. They summarize a lot of existing 
evidence from so-called natural experiments mostly due to education reforms that 
exposed different parts of the population to different lengths of education without self-
selection. While many such pieces of evidence exist and they clearly strengthen the case 
for assuming a causal relationship, the authors also stress that any such evidence must 
fall short of establishing a strong causal relationship for all societies at all points in time. 
When such experiments demonstrate causality for one specific population group in one 
country at one point in time, it is far from clear that this proven relationship also holds 
in very different cultures at different stages of social and economic development. Such 
strong causality may never be proven in the social sciences. 
Instead Lutz and Skirbekk (2014) introduce the concept of functional causality. 
It starts from the premise that in order to use such relationships in a policy context and 
as a basis for projections of the future effects of education in all countries in the world, 
we should focus on establishing functional causality through assessing the following 
three criteria: 
There must be strong empirically observed associations between the two factors 
studied and these associations should hold across different societies and for 
different sub-groups of the population as well as for different points in time 
(considering the appropriate lag structures). The case for the assumption of a 
causal relationship is significantly strengthened if this association is observed both 
at the individual level (across people and households) and the aggregate level 
(across societies).  
There must be a plausible narrative about the mechanisms, by which one force 
influences the other. This explanation must also give specific attention to the 
sequence and timing of events according to the general principle that the cause 
must always transpire before the consequence. In the social sciences it is 
important to consider that the expectation of a coming event also qualifies as a 
cause of behavior and not only the event itself.  
Other obvious competing explanations for the observed associations should be 
explicitly and systematically studied and ruled out as explaining the overall 
pattern of the observed associations. This does not rule out that such other forces 
play a minor and non-dominant role. The two main alternative explanations of 
observed associations are self-selection and reverse causality.  
Lutz and Skirbekk demonstrate that these three criteria are being met in the case 
of education effects on health, mortality, and fertility. The foundations of the effects of 
education on human behavior refer to modern brain research, which leaves no doubt that 
every learning experience and in particular repeated experiences physiologically 
changes our brains by building new synapses that not only store the information content 
of our experiences but also become an integral part of what forms our sense of 
personality (Kandel 2007). While neuroscience still seems to be far away from a full 
understanding of the process of learning, neurological studies have confirmed beyond 
doubt that brain volumes, cortical thickness and neurological structures can be affected 
by more education. Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that cognitive functions that 
relate to our perception of the environment around us, our view of the future, and our 
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degree of rationality are related to our previous education experiences. In particular, 
empirical studies show that better educated individuals tend to have a longer investment 
horizon and are more risk adverse (van der Pol 2011). 
It seems plausible to extend the reasoning of education as a generally 
empowering factor to the association with other outcome variables studied in this paper, 
namely contraception and fertility, economic productivity, the probability of finding a 
job, and general resilience to natural disasters. In addition to the many useful and 
empowering skills that undoubtedly come with education at a deeper level, education is 
also associated with a higher degree of abstraction and counterfactual thinking that is 
necessary to prepare for risks that the person has not yet experienced but that can be 
reasonably assumed to pose a potential danger. (LeVine et al. 2012) 
Several other recent reviews (Baker et al. 2011; LeVine et al. 2012) of the global 
level evidence have come to similar conclusions. While in a few specific cases there 
may be reason to assume reverse causality such as a teenage pregnancy forcing a girl 
out of school, there are often ways to address such issues e.g. through limiting the 
sample to girls before menarche. Possible selectivity with respect to education and 
health is not likely to play a major role when it comes to the aggregate patterns. 
Otherwise countries that experienced massive education expansions – from a privileged 
elite to the general population being educated – should see diminishing positive health 
effects. But no such evidence could be found. Hence, given the current state of global 
level evidence it seems safe to assume that the strong positive effects of education that 
will be summarized in this section are indeed functionally causal, i.e. they can be 
assumed to hold in the foreseeable future. 
3.2 Female Education is Key to Future Global Population Stabilization 
The observed educational differentials are particularly pronounced in countries that 
have just entered the fertility transition. In Ethiopia the 2005 DHS for instance finds that 
the TFR of women without any formal education is 6.1 whereas it is 2.0 for women 
with secondary and higher education. (DHS Ethiopia 2006) While in low fertility 
countries the absolute differences between education levels are clearly smaller the 
relative differences show some regional variations with the lowest in Northern Europe 
and the highest in Latin America and Asia. A comprehensive global analysis of fertility 
trends by level of education in 195 countries is provided by KC et al. (2014) which also 
specifies assumptions for future trends in educational fertility differentials to be used in 
education specific population projections (Lutz et al. 2014).  
Child mortality also systematically varies by level of mothers’ education as will 
be discussed in the following section. The same is true for adult mortality by the 
person’s own level of education. This implies that under a scenario of improving female 
education there will be viewer children born but more of them will survive to higher 
age. Combining these two effects under a high education scenario the lower fertility by 
far outweighs the lower mortality in terms of total population growth. A review article 
in Science under the title “Global Human Capital: Integrating Education and 
Population” (Lutz & KC 2011) illustrates the global level implications of four different 
education scenarios by applying identical sets of education-specific fertility trajectories. 
These calculations isolate the “pure” effect of education from other reasons of possibly 
higher or lower future fertility. The authors define four different education scenarios for 
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the coming decades and present results to 2050 based on a starting year 2000. Already 
by the middle of the century the difference between total world population size resulting 
from the most optimistic Fast Track scenario (FT: 8.9 billion) and the most pessimistic 
Constant Enrolment Numbers scenario (CEN: 10.0 billion) was more than one billion 
people only due to differences in education policies.  
More recently, new calculations were conducted based on 2010 data as the 
starting date, a larger number of countries (195) and seven instead of four education 
categories (Lutz et al. 2014). The data and figures presented here are derived from this 
new assessment. The different education scenarios were again combined with identical 
sets of education-specific fertility trajectories: Under the most optimistic Fast Track 
(FT) education scenario, all countries in the world are assumed to start following the 
pattern of education expansion of the best performer which was South Korea. Although 
for any given country, for example in Africa, it may be unlikely that over the coming 
five years the school enrollment rates will expand at a rate similar to the unprecedented 
expansion in South Korea in the 1960s, it is at least theoretically possible because it has 
actually occurred in the historical experience of at least one country. Under this scenario 
the world’s population will not only be much better educated than in the medium 
scenario but also significantly smaller (8.85 billion in 2060) due to the fact that more 
educated women in developing countries want and have fewer children.  
The GET (Global Education Trend) scenario is a middle-of-the-road scenario 
which is considered to be the most likely one. Its rate of education expansion is derived 
from a Bayesian model that takes the experience of more advanced countries as well as 
country-specific properties into account (Barakat & Durham 2013). According to the 
GET scenario the world population in 2060 will be quite a bit better educated than today 
and increase to 9.36 billion. The global age structure will be close to rectangular up to 
age 50 although the younger cohorts already start to become somewhat less numerous 
(see Figure 4).  
As to the low education scenarios, Figure 4 presents the Constant Enrolment 
Rates (CER) scenario. The CER is a useful benchmark scenario which allows us to 
understand how much of the expected future increase in human capital is a consequence 
of the momentum already embedded in today’s cross-cohort improvements in 
education. When assuming constant future enrollment rates we essentially freeze the 
transitions from lower to higher levels of education at their current levels, which results 
in a constant distribution of the members of younger cohorts over the educational 
attainment categories. But since older cohorts still have different (and typically lower) 
levels of education, the process of demographic metabolism (see Lutz 2013) – in which 
the less educated older cohorts are successively replaced by the better educated younger 
ones – means that even under this CER scenario, the average educational attainment of 
the entire adult population will continue to improve for decades. This is the momentum 
of educational improvement that can be quantified with reference to this CER scenario. 
By 2060 the CER scenario results in a world population of 9.8 billion which is almost 
one billion higher than that resulting from the optimistic FT scenario. The most 
pessimistic CEN (constant absolute enrollment numbers) scenario, which assumes that 
school expansion cannot even keep pace with population growth and hence results in 
lower enrolment rates, was only calculated for selected developing countries and leads 
to yet higher population growth (see Table 2). 
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The comparison between the results of the FT and CER scenarios by 2060 (see 
Figure 4) shows two very different worlds. The only thing these two pictures have in 
common is that in both cases the world population will be bigger and older than it is 
today. Otherwise, at the global level, the assumption of constant school enrollment rates 
in each country leads to an actual increase in the number of people with no education, 
particularly among the younger cohorts (compare to pyramid for 2010 in Figure 4). This 
is because in the least educated countries fertility rates remain much higher than in the 
better educated countries, and therefore these less educated segments of the world 
population are increasing more rapidly. This increase causes a higher proportion of 
younger persons in the world to remain without any education. Under the FT scenario 
the above described educational momentum – due to demographic metabolism – is 
significantly augmented by much better education of the younger cohorts. As a result, 
the global proportion of women without any education would decline from 22 percent to 
only two percent by 2060. Correspondingly, among adult women in the world the mean 
years of schooling would increase from 7.4 years to 13.3 years between 2010 and 2060. 
As Figure 4 illustrates large majorities of both young men and women at the global 
level would have post-secondary education by 2060 under the FT scenario. 
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Figure 4. Age and Education Pyramids for the World in 2010 and as Projected to 2060 
under Three Different Education Scenarios while Assuming Identical Sets of Education-
Specific Fertility, Mortality and Migration Rates (Source: Lutz et al. 2014) 
In conclusion, the above presented findings clearly illustrate that female 
education is a key driver for helping to moderate rapid population growth in today’s 
high fertility countries. This is due to the fact that in virtually all countries of the world 
more educated women have fewer children. As discussed in the previous section on 
“unmet need”, this in turn is due to the fact that better educated women want 
significantly fewer children, are better able to defend their own family size ideals 
against frequent opposition from husbands and grandparents, and are better empowered 
to actually get access to contraception. Of course, good availability of modern 
contraception makes this easier. This is why female education should not be seen as an 
 22 
alternative to providing reproductive health services; rather both approaches should be 
viewed as synergistically reinforcing each other. 
3.3 Female Education Helps to Avoid Millions of Child Deaths 
When new citizens of the world are born, the first months of their life are also the most 
dangerous months of their entire life. A strong negative association between the level of 
mothers’ education and child mortality is well established in the literature. A recent 
systematic review of the empirical evidence from DHS countries using multi-level 
models (Pamuk et al. 2011) shows that mothers’ education is the most important 
determinant of child mortality and in particular is more important than household 
income and wealth. The above described causal mechanisms from empowerment 
through education to better health and longevity apply particularly well to the 
determinants of child mortality. In addition Levine et al. (2012) point at the importance 
of literacy for being able to more rationally address the child’s health status and in 
particular to communicate the child condition to relevant health personnel.  
Given this clear relationship between female education and child mortality, we 
should expect that alternative scenarios about future education trends of women will 
result not only in different levels of fertility – as discussed in the previous section – but 
also of child mortality. In a recent study KC et al. (2014) have numerically calculated 
these effects of alternative education scenarios on the future numbers of child deaths. 
This relationship is shown in Table 2 for a number of least-developed countries by 
comparing different demographic outcomes across the different education scenarios 
which were defined in the previous section. Under the most likely GET scenario, for 
Ethiopia the table shows that population will increase from 83 million in 2010 to 172 
million by 2060, which is more than a doubling of the population due the current high 
fertility rates and a very young age structure. Under the FT scenario, the population in 
2060 would only be 151 million, i.e. more than 20 million less, even when assuming 
identical education-specific fertility rates. Under the most pessimistic CEN scenario, 
however, the population would increase to 194 million. This implies that by 2060 the 
difference between the highest and the lowest education scenarios would be 43 million 
people, which is more than half of the current population of Ethiopia.  
Table 2 also lists the absolute numbers of births and child deaths under the 
different education scenarios for the 5-year intervals starting in the indicated year. In 
Ethiopia in 2060-65, the number of births would be more than twice as high under the 
CEN scenario (17.7 million) than under the FT scenario (8.8 million). As discussed 
above, the effect of different numbers of births on total population growth is moderated 
by the differences in mortality that result from different levels of education. The last 
columns of the table show that the number of child deaths under the age of five would 
be 120,000 under the FT scenario as compared to 363,000 under CER, and 403,000 
under CEN. Hence, the difference due to education is by a factor of three. In other 
words in this 5-year period alone in Ethiopia around a quarter million premature child 
deaths could be avoided if a rapid education expansion policy roughly resembling the 
FT scenarios would be pursued.  
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Table 2. Different Demographic Outcomes as a Consequence of Different Education 
Scenarios for a Number of Least-Developed Countries (Medium Fertility Assumptions). 
Absolute numbers of birth and child deaths are given for the 5-year intervals starting in 
the indicated year. 
  
Population (in million) Births (in'00,000) Child Deaths under 5 (in '000) 
 Year GET CER FT CEN GET CER FT CEN GET CER FT CEN 
              Burkina Faso 2010 16 16 16 16 36 37 35 36 270 275 262 272 
Burkina Faso 2030 27 28 26 28 43 48 35 48 220 252 160 251 
Burkina Faso 2060 43 47 37 47 40 49 28 49 98 142 54 143 
               
              
              DR Congo 2010 66 66 66 66 151 154 148 154 1444 1473 1396 1469 
DR Congo 2030 107 109 104 109 170 186 151 191 1301 1561 1007 1642 
DR Congo 2060 160 169 149 171 145 174 118 181 671 1000 444 1113 
               Ethiopia 2010 83 83 83 83 140 142 139 143 722 727 710 731 
Ethiopia 2030 124 127 120 128 149 166 121 172 526 608 391 633 
Ethiopia 2060 172 188 151 194 129 166 88 177 234 363 120 403 
 
Even under the CER scenario that assumes that school expansion can just keep 
pace with population growth, the absolute number of child deaths is estimated to be 
three times higher as compared to the fastest education expansion scenario. This shows 
that the expansion of female education does not only have significant consequences on 
population growth and development in general, it also has massive direct effects on 
child mortality. 
These results dramatically illustrate how important progress in female education 
is for reducing the future number of child deaths. It can even be argued that these given 
numbers are likely to underestimate the effect of education on child mortality because 
they only consider the individual level effects and not the community-level impacts of 
education. The literature has shown (Fuchs et al. 2010; Pamuk et al. 2011) that there are 
typically spillover effects – normative changes and improvement in health infrastructure 
that result from an increasing proportion of educated women and benefit all women and 
their children. 
In conclusion, the analysis presented and discussed in this section has clearly 
demonstrated that improving maternal education can be is a key strategy in reducing 
future child vulnerability to (by definition) premature death. With reduction in child 
mortality being one of the major international development goals, a population policy 
paradigm that explicitly includes this education effect on child mortality has a much 
more convincing rationale than conventional aggregate level population policies that 
only address population size and age structure or have a limited individual level focus 
on mothers’ reproductive health.  
3.4 Education Reduces Mortality and Disability in Later Life 
There are many factors influencing the health/disability status of an adult person. They 
range from genetic factors to factors associated with individual life style to quality of 
preventive health care and the curative health care systems of a country. But when it 
comes to observable differentials in terms of individual characteristics of people there is 
overwhelming empirical evidence from virtually all countries for which data exist that 
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the risk of mortality and disability varies greatly by level of education for both men and 
women (KC & Lentzner 2010). This difference is best documented for the case of 
mortality where in terms of male life expectancies, the differences between the highest 
and lowest educational groups in various countries range from as high as 12 years (in 
Eastern Europe) to 3-4 years (in Mediterranean countries) (Caselli et al. 2013). What is 
less well known and documented is that the prevalence of disabilities also tends to vary 
greatly with the level of education. In this section I will try to summarize the evidence 
with respect to disability rates of adults in the age span 30-74, for which fairly good 
data has become available as presented in a recent study by KC et al (2014). 
Data for this analysis comes from the World Health Survey (WHO 2013), a 
collection of sample surveys of the adult population of 18 years of age and older in 70 
countries across the globe with data collected in 2002/2003 by personal interviews in 
the local language using standardized survey instruments. 14 percent of the sample 
population in Eastern Europe turned out to be ADL (activities of daily life) disabled. In 
the other four classified regions the proportion of disabled ranged from 9 percent in 
Africa to 5 percent in Latin America. These differences are greatly influenced by the 
fact that the population in Europe is on average much older than that of Africa. But in 
addition to age there are also important differentials with respect to level of education. 
Table 3 shows the percentage of ADL disability in each education group and region for 
the sample before standardizing by age. As for regional differences, Eastern Europe 
appears to have the highest level of disability followed by Africa and Asia, with Latin 
America and Western Europe showing the lowest levels. Eastern Europe also has the 
highest levels of disability across all levels of education.  
Table 3. Proportion of Disabled in Population by Education Level for World Regions, 
Men and Women Aged 30-74 (Source: KC, Lutz, et al. 2014) 
Education Africa Asia Western 
Europe 
Latin America Eastern 
Europe 
None 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.13 0.37 
Primary 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.29 
Secondary 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.12 
Tertiary 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.09 
Total 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.14 
 
These significant differentials by level of education also have important 
implications for our expectations of future increases in overall disability rates in the 
context of population aging. In particular, when these differentials are combined with 
the fact that we know for sure that in all countries where today the young are better 
educated than the older adults, the elderly of the future will be better educated than the 
elderly of today, our projections of future disability rates will be much lower. Under the 
title “With education the future looks different” Lutz (2014a) presents calculations that 
combine the above described educational attainment scenarios with the age- and sex-
specific disability rates currently observed in different world regions. In doing so first a 
constant age/sex profile of ADL disability without considering our observed educational 
differentials was applied to the projection of the future age and sex structure of the 
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population. This is the conventional way of projecting disability which dominates the 
current discussion of the health consequences of population ageing. 
In a second set of calculation the education/disability relationships obtained 
from the WHS analysis were factored in KC et al (2014).This was done for three 
different education scenarios and for more than 100 countries. The results of these 
alternative projections of disability are shown in Figure 5 for women aged 30-74 for 
Asia and Western Europe. Without factoring in education and only considering the age 
pattern of disability (labeled as NES – No Education Scenario) the forecast appears that 
show significant increases in future disability rates simply as a function of significant 
population ageing combined with the fact that older ages have a higher prevalence of 
ADL. This projected increase is particularly strong in Asia where due to the rapid speed 
of fertility decline population ageing over the coming decades will be even faster than in 
most other continents but it is also very pronounced in the figure for Western Europe.  
Once education is explicitly factored into the model the picture looks completely 
different. With education taken into account, under all three scenarios there will actually 
be reductions in disability by 2050 for adult women aged 30-74. Again, the gap between 
the two kinds of projections is most pronounced for Asia. The reason for this lies in the 
fact that in Asia in parallel to rapid population ageing the elderly population will also be 
much better educated than today’s elderly. This in turn is a result of the very rapid 
expansion of schooling among young Asians over the past decades. In some countries 
(including e.g. South Korea and China) in the 1960s a majority of the adult population 
still had no formal schooling at all. Today the young cohorts are very well educated and 
even among the best educated in the world. As a consequence today’s elderly still have 
a very low level of education and we know for sure that the future elderly will be much 
better educated. This finding holds for all three future education scenarios. As shown by 
the CEN scenario even no further improvements in schooling result in a much lower 
level of overall disability than when education is simply not factored into the model, i.e. 
when the apparent heterogeneity by level of education is disregarded. The most rapid 
improvement in disability is clearly shown under the very optimistic FT scenario. 
 
Figure 5. Projected Prevalence of ADL Disability for Women Aged 30-74 in Asia and 
Western Europe 
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In conclusion, this section on adult mortality and disability has demonstrated 
that the prevalence of disability not only varies greatly among countries and across age 
groups but there are also significant and consistent differences with respect to the level 
of education. The scenarios presented above also show that once education is explicitly 
factored in the future looks very different. Instead of the ubiquitous projections that 
show massive increases of future disability rates as a consequence of population ageing, 
this analysis shows that we can actually expect declining adult disability for women 
aged 30-74 even in the rapidly ageing populations of Asia and Western Europe. This 
also has important consequences beyond individual health and well-being in so far as it 
may allow people to stay longer in the labor force and increase the productive potential 
of ageing societies.  
3.5 Education Reduces Unemployment 
An OECD report entitled “Education at a glance” (OECD 2013) makes the strong point 
that education is important, since it makes (young) people less vulnerable to the risk of 
unemployment:  
“The distribution of unemployment within the younger generation sheds light on some of the 
factors that may increase the risk of joblessness, which, in turn, offers insights for policy 
responses. Most notably, educational attainment has a huge impact on employability, and the 
crisis has strengthened this impact even further. On average across OECD countries, 4.8% of 
individuals with a tertiary degree were unemployed in 2011, while 12.6% of those lacking a 
secondary education were. Between 2008 and 2011 the unemployment gap between those with 
low levels of education and those with high levels of education widened: across all age groups, 
the unemployment rate for low-educated individuals increased by almost 3.8 percentage points, 
while it increased by only 1.5 percentage points for highly educated individuals. Without the 
foundation skills provided by a minimum level of education, people find themselves particularly 
vulnerable in an insecure labor market.” (p. 13)  
There are several mechanism that result in this pattern of generally lower 
unemployment for more highly educated younger people (KC, Lutz, et al. 2014). First, 
structural change in the economies of many countries leads to new job creation in 
sectors such as Information and Communication Technology (ICT) that typically 
require higher skills. Secondly, when employers have a choice between a better and 
lower skilled person for any given job it is a rational decision to offer the job to the 
better skilled person in the expectation that he/she will be more productive for a given 
salary level. But on top of this effect of higher skills it has also been argued that there is 
a “signaling effect” which leads to the recruitment of people with better education on 
paper even when the actual skills have not been tested. This can also lead to a crowding 
out effect in which under conditions of a tight labor market more jobs are given to 
people with better education thus resulting in relatively higher unemployment for those 
with lower levels of formal education. All these factors are contributing to the described 
education differentials in unemployment. 
But the pattern can also differ by the stage of economic development of a 
country. While there is ample evidence that higher education increases the chances of 
employment in advanced economies, for developing countries several studies suggest 
that “the nature of educational enrollment, attainment, and employment may be very 
different in rapidly changing societies, and these relationships are likely to change 
across historical time” (Yabiku & Schlabach 2009, p.537). In transitioning societies, 
meaning those that are moving out of being predominantly agrarian, education systems 
 27 
often produce graduates faster than the economy can adjust, leading to a shortage of job 
opportunities in the formal sector for individuals with higher education. Two factors 
that contribute to this phenomenon in a number of developing countries are the high 
aspirations for finding a prestigious job, that often are associated with higher formal 
education, and that the chosen field of studies does not match the demand by the labor 
market. It is not unusual that graduates in one field have serious difficulties finding an 
appropriate job while in other fields there is a lack of qualified graduates.  
Adult unemployment is significantly lower than youth unemployment in 
virtually all European countries for which the data is available. This clearly shows that 
the period of transition from education to entering the labor market is a particularly 
critical phase in the life cycle of all people. Typically the burden of finding a job is 
entirely on the young people themselves. At the same time older people in existing 
employment contracts are typically rather well protected by labor laws and hence the 
first reaction in times of economic difficulties for companies is to stop recruiting young 
people before considering sacking people that are already employed. In addition, in 
times of crises when it comes to terminating employment contracts, younger employees 
are often the ones that are more likely to lose their jobs, since they are often less 
protected by labor laws and cheaper to lay off than older workers.  
Unfortunately, reliable statistics on unemployment by level of education are 
mostly limited to industrialized countries. Eurostat provides consistent annual time 
series for youth unemployment by level of education which is plotted in Figure 6 (using 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) categories with 5 and 6 
referring to post-secondary education). The education differentials in unemployment 
vary over time, but at any point between 2000 and 2012, higher levels of education are 
associated with lower levels of unemployment. The Figure also clearly shows the effect 
of the economic crisis after the boom years until 2008. While youth unemployment rates 
increased for all education groups from 2009 onwards the sharp differences by level of 
education remain unaffected by the crisis, in fact, the differentials still widened a bit as 
a consequence of the crisis. At the level of the EU-27 the unemployment rate of young 
men and women in 2012 was 30 percent for the lowest education groups, 20-23 percent 
for the intermediate education groups and only 18 percent for the highest education 
categories.  
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Figure 6. Youth Unemployment Rate (Ages 15 to 24) for All EU27 Countries 
Combined and Selected Individual Countries, by Highest Level of Educational 
Attainment, 2000 to 2012 (Source: EUROSTAT Database). ISCED levels 0 to 2 = pre-
primary, primary and lower secondary education; ISCED levels 3 and 4 = upper 
secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education; ISCED levels 5 and 6 = first and 
second stage of tertiary education. 
In conclusion, this brief section has demonstrated that with respect to the risk of 
unemployment, young people aged 15-24 tend to be significantly more vulnerable than 
older ones. But this higher vulnerability does not apply equally to all younger people. 
For all countries for which reliable and comparable statistics could be found, by far the 
highest risk of unemployment exists for young men and women with low levels of 
education. The data also indicates that, almost universally, the risk of unemployment 
monotonically decreases with higher levels of education. Hence, particularly in the 
context of technological advance and further automation of production processes, high 
quality education is widely considered a policy priority for assuring future employment 
of individuals and economic competitiveness of populations. It should be considered an 
integral and important part of national human resource management policies.  
3.6 Education is Key to Poverty Reduction 
It is commonly assumed in economic theory that education has an important positive 
effect on economic growth, but until recently the statistical evidence for this assumption 
has been surprisingly weak. Evidence shows beyond any reasonable doubt that, at the 
individual level, more years of schooling generally lead to higher income. But at the 
macroeconomic level, empirical evidence relating changes in education measures to 
economic growth has until recently been ambiguous. Many authors suggest that this 
may be due to problems with the global empirical data on human capital (Barro & Lee 
1996; Benhabib & Spiegel 1994; Cohen & Soto 2007; de la Fuente & Doménech 2006; 
Pritchett 2001). 
The literature on the effects of education on economic growth has already been 
discussed in the previous section on the demographic dividend. Here I will only 
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highlight two other relevant dimensions of education – namely the age/cohort pattern of 
human capital and the distribution across attainment categories that matter for strategies 
of poverty reduction.  
Based on time-series of age-specific educational attainment distributions a study 
published in Science, Lutz et al. (2008) provide for the first time the unambiguous 
statistical evidence (based on econometric models) that education is a consistently 
significant determinant of a country’s aggregate level of economic growth. The key to 
these new results lies in the more detailed and more consistent nature of the new IIASA-
VID dataset on educational attainment by age and sex for 120 countries back to 1970 
(Lutz et al. 2007). In most previous studies (e.g., Barro & Lee 1996) the educational 
attainment of the entire population above the age of 25 was considered as the human 
capital variable which is relatively insensitive to rapid improvements in the education of 
the younger working-age population. The new data provide information by five-year 
age groups and the full attainment distribution which much better describes the inter-
cohort improvements in education in countries that have seen rapid expansions of 
schooling. In addition to greater detail, the consideration of differential mortality by 
level of education and the strict consistency over time of the definition of educational 
categories evidently turned out to be decisive advantages of the new dataset over 
previous ones. 
While the new study and the specific models estimated cannot be described in 
any detail here, I want to point out one important finding of great policy importance: 
For poor countries with low human capital, only the combination of universal primary 
education with broadly-based secondary education results in the kind of rapid economic 
growth that has the potential to push countries out of poverty. This additional 
investment in secondary education provides a huge boost to economic growth, much 
greater than universal primary education alone. In these simulations the effect of 
secondary education works primarily through the adoption of new technologies. From 
this we can conclude that the current Millennium Development Goals’ focus on 
universal primary education is important but insufficient. It needs to be complemented 
with the goal of giving broad segments of the population at least a completed junior 
secondary education or even better, universal secondary education. 
3.7 Education Enhances Democracy 
Another study by Lutz et al. (2010) in the pages of Population and Development Review 
applies the IIASA-VID education reconstructions by age and sex for 120 countries to 
reassess the relationship between improving educational attainment of the population, 
education differentials between men and women, and indicators of civil liberties and the 
quality of democratic institutions. The results are highly statistically significant and 
reaffirm on a broader and more consistent basis the findings from earlier studies in the 
field.  
The theoretical arguments relating education to democracy are manifold. At the 
individual level, education is a determinant of political participation. As the educational 
level increases, individuals tend to develop a stronger sense of civic duty and a greater 
interest in politics. However, to the extent that education causes economic growth, it is 
also an indirect determinant of democracy through the link between wealth at the 
macroeconomic level and democracy. Recent contributions to the theoretical literature 
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on the link between educational attainment and democracy emphasize the increase in 
the benefits of political participation caused by education as the catalytic link relating 
changes in educational measures to changes in democracy. Glaeser et al. (2007) present 
a theoretical model where the effect of education, on the (otherwise weak) incentives 
faced by individuals to support democratic regimes, leads to higher stability of 
democratic regimes in more educated societies. The empirical evidence on the effect of 
education on democracy lends support to a positive relationship between these two 
variables when differences across countries are exploited. Barro (1996) and Glaeser et 
al. (2007) find a positive effect of education on the level of democracy by exploiting 
differences across countries from panel data.  
The positive relationship also appears when the focus is on variations within 
countries over time. While the previous empirical evidence on the effect of changes in 
education on democracy within countries is more mixed (Arellano & Bond 1991; 
Blundell & Bond 1998; Bobba & Coviello 2007), the richer information of the IIASA-
VID dataset allows evaluation of the differential effect of educational attainment 
depending on its distribution across age groups and genders. The multivariate 
econometric studies by Lutz et al. (2010) are based on educational attainment for age 
groups of men and women in five-year steps for 120 countries in the period 1970-2000. 
These studies also control for GDP per capita, the investment rate, life expectancy, the 
urbanization rate, the share of agricultural output on total output, and the change in the 
young-age dependency ratio. Among the interesting findings: Societies with high 
proportions of young people tend to have a lower probability of achieving democratic 
regimes; increases in urbanization and investment tend to lead to political changes in the 
direction of democratization; and education turns out to be a significant and robust 
determinant of democracy. This was tested for mean years of schooling as well as the 
full educational attainment distribution. With respect to gender differentials the findings 
also show that an increase in female relative to male education is a robust predictor of 
changes towards more democratic rights. Lutz et al. (2010) also apply these global level 
findings to the specific case of Iran where the significant increases in female education 
and the most rapid decline in fertility over the past decades suggest a high probability 
for moving into the direction of more democracy over the coming years.  
This study showed that increases in human capital and in particular the 
improvement of female education relative to male education turned out to be the most 
important systematic social change associated with the move towards more democracy 
and higher levels of civil rights and liberties. Since these dimensions together with the 
overall quality and efficiency of governance are often considered key elements of 
sustainable development this is yet another case where a broad understanding of 
population policies including education policies can make it much more relevant than 
the conventional more narrow focus of population policies. 
3.8 Education Enhances the Adaptive Capacity to Already Unavoidable Climate 
Change  
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has recently finished its Fifth 
Assessment Report (IPCC-AR5) which demonstrates with high certainty that global 
climate change is an ongoing reality. While there are some uncertainties remaining 
about what factors contribute to what degree to this ongoing change, almost nobody 
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denies any more that such change is actually ongoing. Hence, no matter how successful 
the world community will be in reducing future greenhouse gas emissions a certain 
degree of climate change is already unavoidable and we have to prepare to cope with it. 
As one of the IPCC-AR5 lead authors for the section on sustainable development I also 
got the strong sense that for this reason the attention is now not only focused on 
mitigating climate change but is also moving increasingly to aspects of adaptation and 
strengthening the future adaptive capacity to already unavoidable climate change. The 
international community has already pledged the significant sum of 100 Billion US 
Dollar per year to be spent on climate change adaptation in developing countries from 
2020 onwards. But it seems to be still quite unclear what precisely should happen with 
this money. Recent work conducted at IIASA suggests that investments in universal 
primary and secondary education would be a good and efficient way to strengthen 
adaptive capacity through enhancing general resilience, particularly in a situation in 
which the precise consequences of climate change in specific areas are still quite 
uncertain. 
But what is the empirical evidence base for claiming that education enhances 
adaptive capacity and reduces vulnerability to climate change? The problem is that 
climate change is just starting to show its first consequences so that it is hard to already 
find solid empirical evidence about what factors are best to reduce the vulnerabilities to 
this kind of change. One possible strategy is to study differential vulnerability to natural 
disaster such as flooding, droughts and storms that have occurred over long periods and 
for which abundant empirical data exist. In this sense, vulnerability to natural disasters 
is not only of significant interest in its own right as a source of premature death in 
developing countries but it can also be seen as isomorphic to the likely future risks 
associated with unavoidable climate change. In other words, if we have a better 
understanding of the risk factors associated with currently observed vulnerabilities to 
natural disasters, we can draw conclusions about the risk factors associated with future 
climate change, in particular with respect to the likely higher frequency and intensity of 
tropical storms, extreme flooding events and severe droughts.  
An international scientific Panel on Population and the Environment recently 
produced a statement that was published in Science (Lutz et al. 2012). It summarizes: 
“The evidence is clear that demographic differences fundamentally affect people’s 
contributions to environmental burdens, their ability to participate in sustainable 
development, and their adaptability to a changing environment” (p. 918). But the 
empirical basis for assessing the role of educational differences has been very scant 
until recently, mostly because the hypothesis has not been on the table and therefore no 
data have been collected to test it. The theoretical argument is quite clear: Education is 
an important way through which individuals acquire knowledge, skills, and 
competencies that can directly or indirectly influence their adaptive capacity. Most 
directly, literacy and numerical skills obtained through formal education imply better 
access to relevant information, such as early warnings for tropical storms or seasonal 
prediction of drought (Patt et al. 2007; Moser & Ekstrom 2010). Second, there is 
evidence that education also enhances cognitive skills and the willingness to change 
risky behavior while at the same time extending the personal planning horizon 
(Behrman & Stacey 1997; Neisser et al. 1996; Nisbett 2009). Education also enhances 
the acquisition of knowledge, influencing values and priorities as well as the capacity to 
plan for the future and improve allocation of resources (Glewwe 1999; Thomas et al. 
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1991). Besides that, as described extensively in this volume, education leads to better 
health and physical wellbeing. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that when 
facing natural hazards or climate risks, educated individuals are more empowered and 
hence more adaptive in their response to, preparation for, and recovery from disasters. 
At the aggregate level it can be argued that better educated societies have greater social, 
economic, and institutional capabilities necessary for successful adaptation to climatic 
change (KC & Lutz 2013).  
Taking the above described approach of seeing disaster vulnerability as proxy 
for climate change vulnerability a recent series of studies has focused on identifying the 
relative role of education in reducing such vulnerabilities and hence provides the basis 
for recommending strategies for reducing vulnerability and enhancing the adaptive 
capacities of populations to unavoidable climate change. A special issue of the journal 
Ecology and Society (2014) is entirely dedicated to studying the empirical evidence on 
this issue with data from different parts of the world. We summarize several of the 
findings following Muttarak and Lutz (2014): Muttarak and Pothisiri (2013) present an 
individual-level study of disaster preparedness of 557 households located along the 
Andaman coast in Phang Nga province during the 2012 Indian Ocean earthquakes. They 
find that formal education – measured at the individual, household and community 
levels – increases the likelihood of preparedness actions being taken. Having been 
affected by the 2004 tsunami clearly increases emergency preparedness but for the 
group of persons without such disaster experience, education turned out to be a relevant 
factor in anticipating the risk and taking preparedness actions. Another tsunami-related 
study by Frankenberg et al (2013) uses individual level data from the Indonesian 
Household Panel to examine the extent to which education serves as a means of 
protection against natural disaster, using longitudinal survey data collected in two 
provinces on the island of Sumatra, before and after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. 
They find that education clearly plays a role in coping with the disaster over the longer 
term, with the better educated being of better psycho-social health five years after the 
tsunami. They are less likely than others to live under precarious living conditions and 
appear to be better at compensating for loss of income following the tsunami. 
Similar evidence on the association between education and vulnerability has 
been reported at the community level by KC (2013). Using comprehensive village-level 
data in Nepal (a microsample of the 2001 census covering 2.5 million individuals 
together with disaster data for 2000-2009) on damages due to floods and landslides in 
terms of human lives lost, animals lost and other damage to households, he finds strong 
effects of education. Comparing the effect of education with those of income and 
wealth, the author concludes that education has stronger and more consistent impacts in 
reducing damage due to floods and landslides in Nepal.  
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Figure 7. Global Level Association between Level of Education and Disaster Fatalities 
with Cuba, Dom Rep and Haiti Marked in the Pattern 
In addition to further studies based on individual level data that essentially show 
the same picture, the special issue also includes some country comparisons. Pichler and 
Striessnig (2013) use data from qualitative interviews conducted in Cuba and the 
Dominican Republic to compare these two island states with regard to disaster 
vulnerability. Even though they usually experience the same hurricanes passing with 
similar strength over Cuba and Hispaniola, the outcomes vary greatly between the two 
countries. While effective disaster response is strongly embedded in the entire Cuban 
population, which is one of the most educated in the developing world, the interviews 
strongly confirm that lack of education and literacy in the Dominican Republic makes 
people more vulnerable and prevents them from even understanding warnings about 
upcoming danger (see Figure 7) 
At a highly aggregate level Striessnig and Lutz (2013) use national-level time 
series of disaster fatalities around the world, regressing them against a number of socio-
economic variables, including also the three components of the Human Development 
Index (HDI). Different models with alternative specifications all find significant effects 
of education – particularly female education – in reducing disaster fatalities, while there 
is no support for the widely assumed role of income per capita in reducing vulnerability. 
These findings suggest that education is the more relevant dimension of socio-economic 
development as compared to income when it comes to enhancing adaptive capacity to 
natural disasters and hence by implication to future unavoidable climate change. This 
 34 
makes an emphasis on human resource development an important part of strengthening 
the adaptive capacity of societies and hence for sustainable development more broadly. 
4 Outlook for the 21st Century: Human Resources at the Heart of 
Sustainable Development Scenarios 
The human resources based population and development policy paradigm described in 
this paper has already been implemented and operationalized in the context of new 
global climate change scenarios which will likely inspire global change analysis for the 
coming decade and beyond. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
has recently finalized its Fifth Assessment Report (AR5). In this context the global 
modeling community on Integrated Assessment (IA) and Vulnerability, Risk and 
Adaptation (VRA) has agreed to refer to a new common set of Shared Socioeconomic 
Pathways (SSPs) that describe alternative future worlds with respect to social and 
economic mitigation and adaptation challenges. Unlike the previous generation of SRES 
scenarios (Nakicenovic et al. 2000) that only considered total population size and total 
GDP as relevant socio-economic factors – and this essentially reduced population to a 
scaling factor for the denominator of different variables – this new set of scenarios 
provides a much richer socio-economic content including alternative population 
scenarios by age, sex, and six levels of educational attainment for all countries in the 
world. The main reason for moving to much more detailed characterizations of the 
socio-economic aspects of global change is that the SSPs are not any more designed 
primarily for the description of the factors contributing to CO2 emissions (the 
challenges for mitigation) but should equally well describe the capabilities of societies 
in terms of differential vulnerability and adaptive capacity to climate change. In this 
respect demographic dimensions such as age, sex, level of education and urbanization 
where considered key factors to be explicitly included in the scenarios.  
This approach is also in line with the recommendations of an interdisciplinary 
global scientific panel which prepared a statement on “Demography’s role in 
Sustainable Development” as input to the 2012 Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable 
Development. (Lutz et al. 2012) Among others this panel urges to “(i) Recognize that 
that the numbers, characteristics, and behaviors of people are at the heart of sustainable 
development challenges and their solutions. (ii) Identify subpopulations that contribute 
most to environmental degradation and those that are most vulnerable to its 
consequences” (p. 918). In this spirit the more differentiated demographic part of the 
SSPs much more comprehensively covers the “human core” of future global change 
than any previous set of global development scenarios (KC & Lutz 2014). 
The SSPs were designed in a lengthy process involving most leading global 
change modeling teams in a process that was guided by the objective to 
comprehensively describe alternative possible future global trends with respect to socio-
economic challenges associated with climate change mitigation and adaptation. In 
addition to population, education and urbanization the scenarios also covered several 
dimensions of the economy and in particular energy consumption and the carbon 
intensity of possible alternative future technologies. While the five scenarios shown in 
Figure 8 are only to be considered as stylized pathways that can have many more 
specific expressions emphasis was put on consistency of the different components of the 
pathways. The definition was guided by a set of five narratives that are listed here 
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whereby I primarily focus on the population and socio-economic dimensions and not on 
the energy and technology aspects of the SSPs: 
 
 
Figure 8. Location of Five SSPs in Space Spanned by Differing Degrees of Socio-
Economic Challenges for Adaptation and Mitigation (Source: O’Neill et al. 2013) 
SSP1 (Sustainability): This scenario assumes a future that is moving toward a more 
sustainable path, with educational and health investments accelerating the demographic 
transition, leading to a relatively low world population. There are major improvements 
in human capital and fertility in OECD countries is moderately high. 
SSP2 (Continuation): This is the middle-of-the-road scenario in which trends typical of 
recent decades continue, with some progress toward achieving development goals, 
reductions in resource and energy intensity, and slowly decreasing fossil fuel 
dependency. In demographic terms it is identical to the medium scenario in the new 
global human capital projections produced by the Wittgenstein Centre for Demography 
and Global Human Capital (Lutz et al. 2014). 
SSP3 (Fragmentation): The scenario portrays a world separated into regions 
characterized by extreme poverty, pockets of moderate wealth, and many countries 
struggling to maintain living standards for rapidly growing populations. In demographic 
terms this is a low education and stalled demographic transition scenario for the 
countries that still have high fertility. 
SSP4 (Inequality): This is a world of high inequalities both among and within countries. 
There is increasing stratification between a well-educated, internationally connected 
society and a poorly educated society that works in labor-intensive industries. 
Demographic assumptions reflect the divisions and inequalities. 
SSP5 (Conventional Development): In this world conventional development oriented 
toward economic growth is viewed as the solution to social and economic problems. 
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Rapid development leads to energy systems dominated by fossil fuels, resulting in high 
greenhouse gas emissions. Demographic assumptions are rather similar to SSP1. 
 
Figure 9. World Population Trends by Level of Education According to the SSP1-3 
Scenarios as Discussed above 
Figure 9 above depicts the global level results for the main scenarios SSP1-SSP3 
in terms of total population size and the level of education of the adult population 
(collapsed into four education categories). The “sustainability” scenario SSP1 that is 
associated with rapid social development and green economic growth will result in a 
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significant increase of the more educated population with world population size peaking 
by mid-century and reaching about the same level as today by 2100. In sharp contrast 
the “fragmentation” scenario SSP3 will see continued rapid population growth reaching 
10 billion by mid-century and more than 12 billion by 2100. This will be associated 
with stagnation of the education expansion in the least developed countries and in 
consequence even some increase of the uneducated and low-educated population 
segments. These populations will not be able to realize the many benefits of education 
described in Part 2 of this paper. 
In the context of the population policy paradigm discussed in this paper the 
“sustainability” scenario SSP1 clearly is the most desirable in many respects. More 
education and better health together with all the other social and economic benefits of 
education and the resiliency to unavoidable environmental change in the context of a 
world population that will peak around mid-century and then enters a moderated decline 
is likely to be associated with the enhancement of long term human well-being that has 
been identified as the ultimate goal of 21st century population and development policies. 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper I first brought together new scientific evidence that puts into question some 
of the dominant assumptions of population policy priorities of the 20th century. It is 
worth reiterating here that I use the term “population” in its genuine meaning referring 
to an aggregate of human beings. And I certainly do not want to play down the very 
important focus on individual human rights that had developed around IPCD which I 
consider as being primarily a human rights issue rather than a population issue. I then 
presented a brief summary of new scientific studies on the multiple beneficial effects of 
education that provide the substantive basis for the new 21st century population policy 
paradigm proposed. This scientific evidence from diverse geographic regions and 
methodological approaches points toward the acquired capabilities of human beings—
human capital or human resources—as the key to sustainable development in both rich 
and poor countries. This suggests that strengthening the human resource base of 
societies should be the priority focus of this new paradigm. 
At this point in the conclusions of a paper that repeatedly stressed the “new” 
aspects, it is also worth noting that this focus on human capital is certainly not entirely 
new in the history of demographic thinking. There is no space here for a review of 
writings on this topic and I only want to cite as an example a rather unexpected 
testimony. In 1958 Alfred Sauvy wrote in the context of the miracle of Germany’s 
economic rise after total destruction in 1945 and the fact that it had to absorb five 
million refugees: “Why this success, contrary to the forecasts of all doctrines…? 
Because these men without capital came with their knowledge, their qualifications. 
They worked and they recreated the capital that was lacking, because they included a 
sufficient number of engineers, mechanics, chemists, doctors, sociologists, etc. If five 
million manual workers had entered Western Germany instead there would be five 
million unemployed today” (Sauvy 1958, p.169). But despite the demographic 
prominence of Sauvy, mainstream demography has not really incorporated this 
important line of thinking. Instead such “quality dimensions” were considered too 
difficult to measure and largely left to economists. Only the more advanced 
demographic tools of multi-state population dynamics, pioneered at and around IIASA 
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in the 1970s, now allow us to fully and quantitatively integrate the educational 
attainment dimension into formal demography.  
This focus on human resources as an integral part of population policies is 
slowly gaining momentum in the international discussions. Independently from the 
above described SSP approach in the climate change community, the UNDP 2013 
Human Development Report makes extensive reference to the need for integrated 
approaches incorporating education, health and population trends in international 
development strategies (UNDP 2013). And the already mentioned global 
interdisciplinary scientific panel on “Population and Sustainable Development” 
concluded the publication of its statement in Science with the sentence: “Invest in 
human capital – people’s education and health, including reproductive health – to slow 
population growth, accelerate the transition to green technologies, and improve people’s 
adaptive capacity to environmental change” (Lutz et al. 2012). While the focus of this 
panel was mostly on developing countries its recommendations were designed to be of 
relevance for all countries of the world.  
What does this new population policy paradigm then have to offer to the 
governments in countries in Eastern Europe which are not only rapidly aging but also 
shrinking? In the introduction to this paper Bulgaria was singled out as a country that 
has officially declared its demographic trends a national security crisis of the first order 
because its population had declined from around 9 million in 1990 to about 7.2 million 
today and is expected to fall to around 6 million in 2030. In this context the following 
statement suggesting a different perspective was made to the prime minister of Bulgaria 
by an international visiting expert:  
“‘People are the wealth of nations. But it is not only the number of people that counts; it is also 
the skills, abilities and health status of the people that matter. All these aspects viewed together 
can be called the human resource base - or human capital in more economic language. This 
broadened view of population also implies that political goals should not be defined in terms of 
population size but rather in terms of human resources available for producing the best possible 
quality of life for all citizens.” (Lutz 2008)  
This new approach to population policy was then prominently included in the 
Bulgarian population policy strategy which translated it also into specific health, 
education, family support and migration policies. More recently, this approach was also 
received well by many government delegations from Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
during the ongoing Cairo+20 population policy review process. It is also reflected in the 
recent White Paper on Population by the government of Singapore. 
(http://population.sg/)  
Human capital and human resource management were also hot topics at the 
recent 2014 annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos. Among others it 
was suggested that in analogy to private sector strategies governments should develop a 
more integrated “Public Human Resource Management”. This view was also captured 
in a piece recently published in the Harvard Business Review:  
“Viewing the quality of human capital as resting on a collection of elements, many of the 
manageable, is something that the private sector has been doing for a long time. Every sizable 
business pays attention to human resource management. For governments the equivalent would 
be a form of national human resource management that considered education, migration, family, 
labor, health, and retirement as components that interact richly – and together drive the richness 
of the future.” (Lutz 2014b) 
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One decisive difference between public and private sector human resource 
management is, however, that states cannot fire people (at least not their own citizens). 
This is why states have social policies in addition to economic policies. But increasingly 
the goals of social policies also go into the direction of trying to empower people to help 
themselves, if at all possible. Or as the German education minister put it on the occasion 
of the 2012 annual assembly of the Max-Planck Society: “Education policy is the social 
and economic policy of the 21st century” (Ministerium für Schule und Weiterbildung 
2012). 
Much more still needs to be done in terms of developing specific policy 
programs that translate these goals into practice in both high and low fertility settings. 
But before the specific policy programs are worked out in detail it is important to be 
clear about the overriding objective is to be pursued. To propose such an objective that 
can guide population policy making for the coming decades was the main objective of 
this paper. This is also the reason for talking about a “population policy paradigm” 
rather than just population policies.  
The ICPD Programme of Action agreed in Cairo in 1994 supposedly did away 
with quantitative demographic targets and in a widely agreed move directed the focus to 
human rights, gender equity and reproductive health – but it did not set any other 
meaningful aggregate level objective that might take the place of the dismantled 
demographic targets. A priority focus on human capital development, beginning with 
and concentrating on education and health, should be the new global population and 
development policy paradigm, based on sound scientific evidence and equally valid for 
all societies around the world. Such a new paradigm will certainly not be accepted over 
night – but the currently ongoing review process associated with Cairo+20 may be a 
good time to start serious discussions about the deeper and longer term goals of 
population policies in the context of sustainable development. 
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6 List of Abbreviations 
ADL - activities of daily life 
AR5 - Fifth Assessment Report 
CEN - Constant Enrollment Numbers 
CER - Constant Enrolment Rates 
DHS - Demographic and Health Surveys 
FT - Fast Track 
GDP - gross domestic product 
GET - Global Education Trend 
GMM - Generalized Method of Moments  
HDI - Human Development Index 
IA - Integrated Assessment 
ICT - Information and Communication Technology 
ISCED - International Standard Classification of Education 
IIASA - International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
IPCC - Panel on Climate Change  
NES - No Education Scenario 
NTA - National Transfer Accounts 
OLF - Optimal Level of Fertility 
OLS - ordinary least squares  
SES - Socio-economic Status 
SSPs - Shared Socioeconomic Pathways 
TFR - Total Fertility Rate 
VID - Vienna Institute for Demography 
VRA - Vulnerability, Risk and Adaptation   
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